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DURKHEIM'S CULT 
OF THE INDIVIDUAL AS CIVIL 
RELIGION: ITS APPROPRIATION 
BY ERVING GOFFMAN 
JAMES J. CHRISS 
University of Pennsylvania 
The purpose of this article is to provide a systematic analysis of 
the place of Durkheim's "cult of the individual" in Erving Goffman's 
sOciology. 1 I have reviewed the most pertinent aspects of Durkheim's 
sociology of religion. This article discusses and/or analyzes the de-
velopment of the cult of the individual primarily within the context 
of Durkheim's (1951) monograph on suicide; Durkheim's notions of 
sacred, profane, and ritual; Goffman's two-pronged intellectual heri-
tage; and Goffman's "Communication Conduct in an Island Commu-
nity" (1953) with respect to several key Durkheimian concepts. Also 
discussed are several important secondary analyses-primarily those 
of' jurgen Habermas and Stanford Lyman-which help to further de-
lineate the conditions of the Durkheim-Goffman link. The final sec-
tion applies Goffman's sociology to the case of Evangelicalism and 
"political civility." 
DURKHEIM'S SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 
Emile Durkheim's sociology was thoroughly imbued with 
concerns over religion and its role in societal change. As 
Pearce (1989) has noted, Durkheim argued-especially in his 
major treatise on religion, The Elementary Forms of the Reli-
A version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the Society for 
the SCientific Study of Religion, Pittsburgh, PA, November 1991. I thank Teresa Labov, 
Bruce Wearne, Arthur Greil, and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments 
on several earlier drafts. 
1As will be discussed more fully below, the phrase "cult of the individual" 
refers to Durkheim's view of societal progression and the concomitant shift of em· 
phasis toward the sanctity of the individual. There has been some terminological 
confusion surrounding this general concept, however: besides "cult of the individ· 
ual" or "individualism;' a number of other phrases have been used nearly inter-
changeably by a variety of translators (and even by Durkheim himself), e.g., "religion 
of humanity;' "dignity of the human person;' "cult of personality;' and "cult of man" 
{for an excellent discussion of these and related terminological matters, see Pickering 
(19M, pp. 481-487]). For the sake of uniformity, then, I will, for the most part, follow 
Marske's (1987) usage of "cult of the individual:' 
gious Life-that everything social begins with religion, and that 
there is no known society that does not possess or exhibit 
some form of religion. 
Durkheim (1938, 1951, 1954, 1984) was fascinated with the 
power of religion and religious ideals in shaping the lives of a 
community of believers. His now-famous distinction between 
preliterate and advancing or modern societies hinged upon a 
formulation that posited very different forms of solidarity cor-
responding with their respective species of SOciety. That is to 
say, pre literate societies are dominated by a mechanical solidar-
ity whose source is homogeneity, conformity of its members 
through harsh and repressive sanctions (i.e., penal law), and a 
collective consciousness that completely envelops and subor-
dinates the individual to the society. In contrast, organic soli-
darity represents a form of moral development wherein soli-
darity is forged through heterogeneity, interdependence of 
societal members, a shift toward restitutive law, and the emer-
gence of the division of labor. 
As one might expect, the role of religion in these societies 
corresponds with the nature of social solidarity vis-a-vis this 
mechanical-to-organic progression. As stated above, although 
Durkheim was concerned with, and even somewhat in awe of, 
religion, he felt that traditional religion was on the wane and 
would not persist in Europe. In fact, Durkheim (1954, p. 475) 
once said that " . .. the old gods are growing old or already 
dead, and others are not yet born:' 
But we immediately sense a paradox in Durkheim's sociol-
ogyof religion. On the one hand, Durkheim says that every-
thing begins with religion and that it will always be a compo-
nent of social life. On the other hand, however, he sees the 
force of religion slowly waning and a general trend of secular-
ization emerging as societies move toward organic solidarity. 
How can these seemingly disparate positions in Durkheim's 
thought be reconciled? 
Durkheim's attempt to account for the twin phenomena 
of ongOing secularization in light of the staying power of reli-
gion as a primordial force in modern society is at heart the 
problem of " man and society" and the nature of individualism. 
Rather than doing away with religion or suggesting that it 
would soon become an analytically inconsequential category, 
Durkheim merely shifted the quiddity of the religious force 
from societal representation (as per mechanical solidarity) to 
the sanctity of the individual (as per organic solidarity). This is 
most clearly illustrated in the progression of Durkheim's 
thought beginning in his monograph on suicide (Durkheim 
1951) and extending through his last great work, The Elemen-
tary Forms of the Religious Life (1954). 
SUICIDE 
let us turn to one passage in particular from Suicide (1951, 
p. 341) that stands out as a seemingly exemplary instance of 
Durkheim's functionalism: 
Suicide is, then, a transformed and attenuated homicide ... , 
It would even seem that one should not try to restrain its 
scope by prohibitive measures .... It is a safety-valve which 
is useful to leave open. In short, suicide would have the very 
great advantage of ridding us of a number of useless or 
harmful persons without social intervention, and hence in 
the most simple and economical way. Is it not better to let 
them put themselves out of the way voluntarily and quietly, 
than to force society to eject them from its midst by vio-
lence? 
Now anyone who has given Suicide a thorough and thoughtful 
reading should recognize instantly that the naive functionalism 
evident in the above quote is merely rhetorical. In point of fact, 
Durkheim goes on to argue against such notions as these. 
However, at least one strand of thought from the quote 
seems in line with what Durkheim has been theorizing in more 
general terms, namely his notion that as social solidarity pro-
gresses from mechanical to organic the society's laws tend to 
transform from harsh and repressive to more lenient and resti-
tutive. According to this line of thinking, one might expect 
Durkheim to suggest in Suicide that prohibitive measures 
against suicide should wane as a society becomes more mod-
ern. But this, in fact, is not the case. Rather, Durkheim is careful 
to construct an argument against the notion that condemna-
tion against suicide lessens as societies advance. After dedicat-
ing the first parts of the book to the verification that suicide is 
indeed a social, rather than a psychological, phenomenon, 
Durkheim approaches this question by asking, to what degree 
should suicide be considered a criminal act? 
To answer this, Durkheim takes a brief historical digres-
sion, a retreat through time to compare how different societies 
and ages have viewed suicide. Durkheim's (1951, p. 326) strat-
egy, then, is to discover " . .. how peoples actually have esti-
mated suicide morally in the course of history; then try to find 
the reasons for this estimate:' He (1951, p. 327) begins with the 
assessment that lias soon as Christian societies were formed, 
suicide was formally forbidden in them:' From 452 A.D. in the 
council of Aries to Prague in 563 and on through to the throne 
of louis XIV in 1670, Durkheim traces the record of each soci-
ety's moral and legal sanctionings against suicide. As might be 
expected, Durkheim finds a general trend: with the progres-
sion of time there has been a concomitant change from repres-
sive, barbaric punishment against suicide or its attempt to-
ward, if not decriminalization, at least the lessening of the 
penalty. Thus, for example, Durkheim (1951, p. 329) shows that 
according to the 1881 New York penal code suicide was still 
listed as a crime, but "in spite of this, punishment has been 
given up for practical reasons, since the penalty could in no 
way affect the guilty person:' 
What Durkheim (1951, p. 332) is leading to here is that, 
beyond the primitive stage, legislation concerning suicide falls 
into two broad categories. First, in earlier societies (specifically 
the Greco-latin city-states) the state stands in complete domi-
nation over the individual: " . .. the individual is forbidden to 
destroy himself on his own authority; but the State may permit 
him to do so:' Since the collective conscience is still strong 
here, the individual who takes his or her own life is in effect 
transgressing against the state for not collaborating before-
hand with the "organs of life:' 
In the second, more modern period-with the emergence 
of organic solidarity-Durkheim (1951, p. 333) suggests that 
"condemnation [against suicide] is absolute and universal:' In 
this new morality not even the state has the right or privilege to 
take (or allow the taking of) a life. With the progression of mo-
rality, of organic solidarity, suicide is now viewed as an immoral 
act in and of itself. Thus, in answer to his own rhetorical query 
posed earlier, Durkheim responds by saying that "with the pro-
gression of history the prohibition [against suicide] becomes 
more strict:' It is by this presentation of the historical record 
that Durkheim shows how moral evolution affects and directs a 
society's legislation against suicide. 
Durkheim describes this trend toward greater condemna-
tion of suicide as resulting from the change of focus in modern 
society away from the state and more toward the human per-
sonality. The human personality has, in effect, become sacred, 
and it is exalted to a level even above and beyond that of soci-
ety itself. Whereas before the state had rights over the individ-
ual in terms of allowing a suicide, today the dignity of the self 
transcends all, including that of the individual. Durkheim (1951, 
pp. 333-334) explains this seemingly paradoxical statement as 
follows: 
But today [the individual] has acquired a kind of dignity 
which places him above himself as well as above society. So 
long as his conduct has not caused him to forfeit the title of 
man, he seems to us to share in some degree that quality sui 
generis ascribed by every religion to its gods which renders 
them inviolable by everything mortal. 
Thus, according to Durkheim, the individual-that store-
house of the human personality-becomes sacrosanct. Men 
and women now, as a result of the division of labor and the 
onset of organic solidarity, worship each other's quality of "oth-
erness:' The taking of one's own life is no longer simply a 
transgression against the state; it is now the ultimate sacrilege. 
Morality rests within the very otherness of the other and of 
ourselves; the "cult of human personality" is the new, modern-
day object of worship. To strike against it by committing sui-
cide is to strike against the very heart and soul of humanity. 
Durkheim makes, in my own estimation, a compelling 
case for the move toward a greater emphasis on the sacred 
nature of the individual. There seems little evidence to deny 
his suggestion that beginning in antiquity-in the original state 
of affairS-SOciety is viewed as everything while the individual 
is nothing. Things are done for society's sake; individuals are 
simply means for achieving society's ultimate ends or pur-
poses. But over time, as he has shown, the face of society 
changes; the very nature of morality itself goes through a meta-
morphosis, growing from infancy to adulthood. It is at this 
point where Durkheim really begins to pull it all together thea-
retically, where he begins to incorporate in a very meaningful 
way the important strands of thought from his earlier work in 
Division of Labor. It is a passage worth quoting in its entirety. 
As Durkheim (1951, p. 336) explains: 
But gradually things change. As societies become greater in 
volume and density, they increase in complexity, work is di-
vided, individual differences multiply, and the moment ap-
proaches when the only remaining bond among the mem-
bers of a single human group will be that they are all men. 
Under such conditions the body of collective sentiments in-
evitably attaches itself with all its strength to its single re-
maining object, communicating to this object an incompara-
ble value by so doing. Since human personality is the only 
thing that appeals unanimously to all hearts, since its en-
hancement is the only aim that can be collectively pursued, 
it inevitably acquires exceptional value in the eyes of all. It 
thus rises far above all human aims, assuming a religious 
nature. 
Thus the cult of the individual comes to full fruition.2 This new 
religion of man is not an egoistical, individualistic celebration 
of human qua human (a la standard utilitarianism), it is, rather, 
this notion of a shared moral community. It is the realization 
that the human personality ordains within each of us a moral 
dignity that transcends and goes beyond the claims of any per-
son or thing, including the state. But at the same time the es-
sence of this morality-this ideal that subordinates us all to the 
general interests of humanity but that simultaneously draws 
each of us beyond ourselves as well-is not possessible within 
us as individuals; rather it is an essence set apart, sui generis. 
As Durkheim (1951, p. 33n explains, "Our dignity as moral be--
ings is therefore no longer the property of the city-state; but it 
has not for that reason become our property, and we have not 
acquired the right to do what we wish with it. How 
2Although I draw primarily from Suicide in tracing the development of the cult 
of the individual, one should note that Durkheim was involved in similar discussions 
in Professional EthICS and CivIC Morals (1957, pp. 69-72) and Moral EducatIon (1961, 
pp. 6-12). For excellent summaries of these latter treatments see, respectively, Lukes 
(1972, pp. 268-274) and Mestrovic (1988, pp. 134-140). Finally, Marske (1987) provides 
perhaps the most extensive discussion of the progression of Durkheim's thought on 
moral individualism. 
couid we have such a right if society, the existence greater than 
ourselves, does not have it?" Hence, Durkheim shows that sui-
cide is indeed an immoral act because no one has the right to 
deny oneself this religion of man. 
THE SACRED, THE PROFANE, 
AND RITUAL 
One of Durkheim's (1954) best-known distinctions is that 
of sacred versus profane. All societies employ symbols that are 
externalized vehicles for the representation of intersubjective 
feelings and collective sentiment. Symbols perpetuate the so-
cial order, and the songs we sing, the prayers we pray, the 
national anthems that stir us to rise in unison, even the particu-
lar or secret handshake of a special group-all these reinforce 
the social solidarity (TIryakian 1978, p. 220). 
The most compelling sentiment for Durkheim (1954) in 
providing the foundation of group identity is the religious sen-
timent, i.e., the feelings of the sacred. Human cultures (or be-
lief systems) tend to divide the world and lead individuals to 
perceive and experience two categories: 1) the sacred-toward 
sacred entities we take an affective or expressive orientation 
that views these objects as ends in themselves (e.g., totems); 2) 
the profane-those things and attitudes characteristic of the 
economic, rather than the religious, life. Profane objects elicit 
instrumental and/or utilitarian orientations; they are means to-
ward some further goal. Economic life is dull, monotonous, 
and "generally of a very mediocre intensity" (Durkheim 1954, 
p. 247). The understanding of society and the beliefs and mean-
ings that group members hold as collective representations of 
that society reside in the religious life. Beyond the rational cal-
culations of economic life, the partaking of ritual in collective 
ceremonies and other dramatic occasions binds societal mem-
bers together in a form of solidarity that is affective, marked by 
periods of festivity and enthusiasm. 
Ritual, then, is the mechanism by which members partak-
ing of the religious life recreate the crescendo of collective 
sentiment forged around the symbolic understanding of mana, 
or the soul. Humans have always (but especially so in modern 
times) felt the urge to transcend the conditions of the mun-
dane world of the economic life toward the extraordinary 
world of the sacred, because it is in these times of collective 
stimulation through ritual that primordial and ultimate under-
standings of being in the world are obtainable. liryakian (1978, 
p. 220) is correct, I believe, when he stated that Durkheim's 
(1954) analysis, although concentrating on primitive tribes and 
their relation to the sacred, is relevant to the case of modern 
society. It is especially relevant in the case of Goffman's sociol-
ogy. 
GOFFMAN'S INTELLECTUAL LINEAGE 
There are two strands of thought undergirding Erving 
Goffman's sociology.3 One of these is the senior line of phe-
nomenological scholarship that MacCannell (1983, p. 11) has 
described as "the Husserl-Heidegger-Sartre-Goffman succes-
sion:' This particular strand of phenomenology (as opposed to 
the Schutz-Berger and Luckman variety) attempts to describe 
the nature of intersubjective understanding in the realm of the 
everyday and mundane. Current phenomenological sociology 
as seminally derived from Husserl has progressed through a 
variety of stages, most importantly "existentialism" in the form 
of, e.g., Heidegger and Sartre, and "deconstruction ism" by way 
of, e.g., Merleau-Ponty and Laing (as well as various other 
forms of revision and update, e.g., Vaitkus [1991]). These revi-
sions and critiques of the original Husserlian project appear in 
Goffman's work in the guise of, e.g., "frames" and "multiple 
realities" (1974, 1979, 1981), "signs" and "being-with" (1961b, 
1971), the structure and phenomenon of the social "self" (1959, 
1961a, 1963a), and intersubjective understanding of the other, 
be it via either the everyday and mundane (e.g., the practical or 
fiduciary attitude), or manipulated and "strategic" interaction 
(1963b, 1969, 1971). 
The second of Goffman's intellectual lineages, and the 
one with which this study is primarily concerned, hails from 
British social anthropology and, of course, the work of Emile 
3More to the pOint, these are the two major strands of Goffman's thought that, 
I emphasize, are most important in understanding his view of the individual and 
morality in modern society. There are other influences, of course; in several recent 
statements, Burns (1992) and Stein (1991) illustrate how Durkheim, Simmel, the Chi-
cago School, animal ethology, and linguistic philosophy all contributed in important 
ways to Goffman's oeuvre. 
Durkheim (Collins 1986, 1988; MacCannell 1990). Although re-
ceiving his Ph.D. in sociology from Chicago, Goffman never-
theless eschewed the training in symbolic interactionism for 
which that department was famous. Hence, instead of Blumer 
or Mead, Goffman chose to study under the anthropologist/so-
ciologist Lloyd Warner, himself heavily influenced by Durkheim 
(Collins 1980, 1986; Hannerz 1980). 
Although the two intellectual lines as discussed above are 
readily evident and distinct, I argue that Durkheim's notion of 
ritual played the greatest part in informinp Goffman's theories 
concerning social interaction and order. Goffman's formula-
tion of social action secularizes religious morality by exhibiting 
how individuals are imbued with a variety of competencies at 
the level of the interaction order, thereby following Durkheim's 
own theories of the shift toward an increasing sanctification of 
the individual. 
It should also be stated that, although distinct, the two 
strands of Goffman's thought-phenomenological-existential 
and SOciological-are not necessarily antithetical. Edward Ti-
ryakian (1961) has argued, for example, that although "existen-
tialism" and IIsociologism" are different approaches to the 
question of "the individual and society:' the two have success-
fully been brought together by Emile Durkheim. It is suggested 
that Goffman has indeed reconciled these two approaches in 
his theory by embracing, again, the Durkheimian formulation 
of ritual. 
DURKHEIM AND GOFFMAN: A BEGINNING 
I begin this section with a discussion of Goffman's (1953) 
dissertation, because it is here that some important insights are 
afforded with respect to both Goffman's relation to the 
thought of Emile Durkheim and his attempt to explicate the 
4Although the argument of a Durkheim-Goffman link is certainly not new or 
novel (see, e.g., Collins 1975, 1980; Collins and Makowsky 1972; Miller 1982; Mitchell 
1978), I intend to clarify and update the argument along several dimensions. One, 
beginning in this and extending into follOWing sections I shall present certain key 
passages from Goffman that, although largely neglected, nevertheless provide impor-
tant new glimpses into the Durkheimian core. Two, I shall attempt to pull together 
the loose strands of Goffman's thought (as alluded to above and as discussed in, e.g., 
Alexander 1987; Giddens 1981, 1988; and Williams 1988) through an interpretive ma-
trix informed primarily by Jurgen Habermas and Stanford Lyman. 
nature of morality, especially within the realm of face-to-face 
interaction. 
The crucial passage is contained within Goffman's discus-
sion of "sign situations:' that is, the unique array of informa-
tion relaying, processing, monitoring, and control that emerges 
whenever persons enter into each other's immediate presence. 
The initial evaluations by each actor of the other's appearance, 
gestures, countenance, demeanor, and so forth provide a pro-
visional definition of the situation. Within the context of this 
process of discovery and negotiation, however, Goffman (1953, 
p. 103) further suggests that 
For the actor, others may come to be seen as sacred objects. 
The social attributes of recipients must be constantly hon-
ored; where these attributes have been dishonored, propiti-
ation must follow .... [The actor] must conduct himself with 
great ritual care, threading his way through one situation, 
avoiding another, counteracting a third, lest he unintention-
ally and unwittingly convey a judgment of those present that 
is offensive to them. 
This is the beginning of Goffman's use of Durkheimian imag-
ery. 
Notice next Goffman's less than subtle jab at Mead and 
Weber, both of whom he accuses of placing an undue stress 
upon the instrumental or rational dimension of social action. 
This misguided view of action has, according to Goffman, 
caused these and other theorists to completely overlook-
indeed, even be blinded to-the actual moral fiber finely en-
twined in the rituals of face-to-face interaction. As Goffman 
(ibid.) explains, 
The ritual model for social interaction has been poorly 
treated in the literature, perhaps because of the stress given 
by G. H. Mead and by Weber to the fact that a social rela-
tionship, and hence social interaction, was a product of two 
persons taking each other's actions into consideration in 
pursuing their own actions. This stress seems to have given 
an instrumental flavor to our thinking about the kinds of 
consideration we show in regard to others: the implication 
is that we take into consideration the actions of others <the 
better to achieve our personal ends, whatever these may be) 
and not so much that we give consideration to other per-
sons. By "consideration" we have tended to mean calcula-
tion, not considerateness. 
Goffman (1953, p. 104) continues in this same vein, citing along 
the way Durkheim's Elementary Forms of the Religious Life as 
providing the basis upon which this aspect of his dramaturgical 
theory has been forged: 
A case may be made for the view that the best model for an 
object to which we give consideration is not a person at all, 
but a sacred idol, image or god. It is to such sacred objects 
that we show in extreme what we show to persons. We feel 
that these objects possess some sacred value, whether posi-
tive and purifying, or negative and polluting, and we feel 
disposed to perform rites before these objects. These rites 
we perform as frequently and compulsively as the sacred 
value of the object is great. These worshipful acts express 
our adoration, or fear, or hate, and serve for the idol as peri-
odic assurances that we are keeping faith and deserve to be 
in its favor. When in the idol's immediate presence we act 
with ritual care, appreciating that pious actions may favor-
ably dispose the idol toward us and that impious actions 
may anger the idol and cause it to perform angry actions 
against us. Persons, unless they are of high office, do not 
have as much sacred power or mana as do idols, and hence 
need not be treated with as much ceremony. An idol is to a 
person as a rite is to etiquette. 
This last sentence is quite telling, because it helps explain 
Goffman's lifelong fascination with rules of etiquette, norms of 
politeness, access rituals, face engagements, territories of the 
self, body gloss, personal fronts, deference and demeanor, and 
on down the line. Also, those who are uncomfortable with 
what might be perceived as an overly optimistic or overex-
tended analogy-that is, face-to-face interaction as a secular-
ized form of religious ritual-can take comfort in Goffman's 
own clarification of the extent to which he is willing to carry it. 
"An idol is to a person as a rite is to etiquette" is an important 
part of understanding both how Goffman himself understands 
Durkheim and how in modern, secular society we continue to 
witness persons orienting themselves-for whatever reason-
toward a perceived moral universe. 
Next, a slight digression will be offered in the following 
two sections, one that retraces the Durkheim-to-Goffman link 
through a variety of important interpretations, the purpose of 
which is to tie together the loose strands of Goffman's intellec-
tual lineage mentioned in the previous section. 
FROM DURKHEIM TO MEAD 
I spoke earlier of the two major components of Goffman's 
thought, namely the phenomenological and the sociological. It 
was suggested that Durkheim's sociology affords a bridge be-
tween these two formulations, the phenomenological or exis-
tential representing the "man" or "individual" (i.e., micro), and 
the sociological representing the "society" (i.e., macro) aspect 
of the problem. With this in mind we may now turn briefly to a 
related set of concerns with which Jurgen Habermas has dealt. 
In a brilliant piece of theoretical synthesis, Habermas 
(1987) has made explicit much of what is implicit or embedded 
in Goffman, this by providing a bridge between Durkheim and 
Mead.s We have already seen in Durkheim that religion is the 
outward manifestation of the collective consciousness. These 
ritual gatherings that reflect solidarity and group belief were 
observed as well by Mead in his theory of the development of 
personality. As Mead (1962) states, "It is where the 'I' and 'me' 
can in some sense fuse that there arises the peculiar sense of 
exaltation which belongs to the religious and patriotic attitudes 
in which the reaction which one calls out in others is the re-
sponse which one is making himself:' 
Habermas (1987) thus suggests that both Mead and 
Durkheim were concerned with the Iinguistification of the sa-
cred. First, Mead's theory of the development of the personal-
ity implicitly views religious symbolism as the archaic core of 
norm consciousness, because the move toward conceptualiz-
SHabermas (1984) accuses Goffman's dramaturgical theory of action of being 
one-sided in its emphasis on the strategic and goal-oriented nature of actors' self-
presentations. However, Habermas (1987, p. 46) also argues that Durkheim's notion of 
the collective consciousness is helpful for his own theoretical program insofar as it 
represents for Habermas a prelinguistic root of communicative action. So even 
though Habermas is overtly critical of Goffman, his discussion of Durkheim and the 
ontogenesis of ritual unwittingly reveals a positive relation between Durkheim and 
Goffman for which I am here attempting to argue. The relation between Habermas 
and Goffman-especially as mediated through Durkheim-is complex and cannot be 
pursued further here. For a very brief statement of the "Habermas-Goffman" prob-
lem, see Chriss (1992). 
ing the generalized other (through which the personality and 
the individual is forged) occurs only through and upon the 
acquisition of complex language or linguistic codes. Second, 
Durkheim's theory of societal progression emphasizes the 
scientization or rationalization of worldviews and the concomi-
tant diminution of the religious force (Pickering 1984, p. 482). 
For Durkheim, rationalized codes of conduct such as the (ex-
plicit) rise of civil, restitutive law and the (implicit) cult of the 
individual exemplify the nature of modern society. With regard 
to both Mead and Durkheim, then, Habermas (1987, p. 46) 
states that liTo the degree that the rationality potential in-
grained in communicative action is released, the archaic core 
of the normative dissolves and gives way to the rationalization 
of worldviews, to the universalization of law and morality, and 
to the acceleration of processes of individuation.6 
FROM MEAD TO GOFFMAN 
The full implications of Mead's and Durkheim's views of 
ritual and the linguistification of the sacred will come to light 
only after completing another crucial progression of thought, 
this time from Mead to Goffman. For this I draw primarily from 
the works of Stanford lyman (1990, 1991; Vidich and lyman 
1985). 
lyman's general theme is that the enlightenment ethos that 
resonates through the writings of those philosophers and social 
theorists being discussed here led each to a worldly rejection of 
religion. Our problem can be seen then as a double hermeneu-
tic (Giddens 1979) or what Goffman (1974) has referred to as a 
frame within a frame: 1} social scientists struggling to under-
stand and explain what is theorized to be a generalized and 
inexorable process, namely the secularization of society; and 2) 
caught up as they were in the spirit and ethos of their time, 
these same theorists felt the effects of the hypothesized rational-
ization of worldviews, the universalization of morality, etc., re-
6/t is suggested that this rationalization of worldviews is a concomitant of 
Durkheim's theory of societal progreSSion, namely, the shift from mechanical to or-
ganic solidarity. The cult of the individual is seen as ariSing through the prism of the 
division of labor and the continuing differentiation of tasks, thereby producing a new 
form of morality that is itself based upon the heightened interdependence of societal 
members. 
cursively in their own writings-this of course amounting to the 
worldly rejection of religion as a lived conviction. 
Without going into great detail we could, following Vidich 
and lyman (1985, p. 267), say that the intellectual lineage from 
Josiah Royce and Durkheim through Mead, Blumer, and finally 
Goffman illustrates that lithe binding covenant of the [earlier] 
Protestant ethicists erodes in the face of the emergence of a 
plurality of worldly, nonbinding situational and personal eth-
ics:' Hence, for example, in place of Durkheim's collective con-
science or community of individuals there is now polysymbolic 
interpretation (Vaitkus 1991) and unanchored selves, i.e., the 
cult of the individual.7 
If we can agree with Harry Johnson (1979, p. 313) that reli-
gion is "a kind of code, model or paradigm that shapes or pat-
terns a more or less 'total' way of life: inner experience, action, 
and judgment:' we see that each of our theorists was led to ask 
the same question: if in fact the religious force is on the wane, 
what is or will be the moral basis of an enlightenment society? 
Vidich and lyman (1985, p. 268) suggest that although they 
are all committed to some form of secularized (i.e., rational-
ized) thought, neither Royce's retreat into Pauline communitar-
ian ism nor Mead's collective will of the generalized other, nor 
even Blumer's conception of a secular ethics of the public in-
terest are able to establish the kind of moral basis upon which 
societal members could orient their actions. This is because of 
the overly individualistic nature of the solution to the problem 
of how and by what process the individual becomes free from 
religious control toward the ultimate privatization of religion. 
In other words, as Habermas's (1987) Iinguistification of the sa-
cred suggests, there must be some outwardly visible, binding 
ethos or morality-the total way of life once provided by 
religion-by which societal members could guide their actions. 
Goffman's solution is to place the externalization of the 
moral code directly onto the structure of face-to-face interac-
tion itself, thereby overcoming the theoretical complications 
arising from attempts to explicate or represent psychological 
processes of norm internalization. In one of his earlier papers, 
7This idea of "unanchored selves" should not, however, be equated with un-
healthy egoism, but rather should be seen as running closer to the spirit of the type 
of healthy individualism espoused by Durkheim. 
liThe Nature of Deference and Demeanor:' Goffman (1967, p. 
47) outlines this approach and makes explicit his connection to 
Durkheim: 
In this paper I want to explore some of the senses in which 
the person in our urban secular world is allotted a kind of 
sacredness that is displayed and confirmed by symbolic 
acts .... Through these reformulations I will try to show that 
a version of Durkheim's social psychology can be effective 
in modern dress. 
What Goffman has hit upon is the rather straightforward 
notion that all societies have rules of conduct that are orga-
nized into codes by which individuals are or become aware of 
what types of acts are appropriate or inappropriate in which-
ever type of social setting. Whether ceremonial or substantive, 
these messages carried in acts or events say something about 
the degree to which individuals in the group understand or 
show appreciation for the nature of the gathering. 
Durkheim (e.g., 1938, 1951, 1984) has shown that in prelit-
erate societies the nature of individual action is constrained to 
the extent that it is relegated to a sort of mechanical acquies-
cence to the group. As stated earlier, this type of mechanical 
solidarity, oftentimes instantiated in religious ceremony or rit-
ual, ensures that specific, sanctioned forms of conduct will 
emerge. At this stage-the mechanical form of solidarity-there 
is no conception of the individual, as even slight variations 
from the group norm can bring quick and harsh reprobation. 
Durkheim's (1984) sociology of law emerged from his ob-
servations concerning the extent to which societal laws tend to 
be either repressive or restitutive. A premodern society with its 
concomitant form of mechanical solidarity would be character-
ized by (if any) punitive laws, whereas modern society with its 
organic solidarity would be characterized by restitutive law. 
Goffman (1967, p. 90) of course realizes this as well, stating 
that liThe rules of conduct which bind the actor and the recipi-
ent together are the bindings of society:' His work thereby re-
veals what lies at the intersection of the sociology of religion 
and the sociology of law (lyman 1990, 1991). Following from 
Durkheim's theory of the progression of society, Goffman de-
picts a social action predicated on the notion of a civil religion 
whose outward manifestations are the tacit set of rules and 
conventions-the rituals, if you will-guiding the course of 
face-to-face interaction. But unlike Mead's generalized other, 
Goffman's civil religion emphasizes that individuals are driven 
into self-presentation and -promotion. Society thereby has be-
come primarily a species of communicative conduct wherein 
"each member presents what he hopes are efficacious excuses 
or justifications for acts called into question" (Vidich and ly-
man 1985, p. 306; d. Habermas 1987). 
As we see, then, Durkheim and Goffman were both ulti-
mately concerned with describing the conditions of social or-
der, Durkheim at the macro level and Goffman, the micro 
I eve 1.8 Goffman's expansive illumination of categories and ty-
pologies of the various ways societal members navigate the 
conditions of the interaction order-through the revealing or 
concealing of secrets; the commitment, attachment, embrace-
ment, or role-distance to or from social or cultural objects; the 
handling of personal and use space; access rituals; accounts, 
apologies, remedial and supportive interchanges, face work; 
frames, fabrications, keyings; and through various forms of talk 
and the gestural and expressive signifiers that obtain-attests 
to the array of social tools available to individuals by which 
each may indicate the degree to which they are competent and 
willing to partake in the living of group life.9 
8MacCanneil (1990) has made much the same pOint, arguing that Goffman's 
appropriation of Durkheim can be seen as the continuing attempt to delineate the 
external or visible (i.e., nonpsychological) factors-here being the interpersonal rit-
uals of the interaction order-that operate in binding individuals to a moral code in 
the face of ongoing secularization. For a similar analysis of how ritual provides a link 
between the macro and micro, see Miller (1982). 
9'fhe point is that GoHman, like Durkheim, suggests that the individual has 
become the principal sacred object in secular society. The self, however, is not negoti-
ated as in Mead or Blumer; rather, " ... it is the archetypal modern myth. We are com-
pelled to have an individual self not because we actually have one but because social 
interaction requires us to act as if we do" (Collins 1986, p. 107). See also Hannerz 
(1980), Berger (1973), and MacCannell (1990), each of whom discusses the appropria-
tion by GoHman of Durkheim's notion of mana (soul). As the soul of the human being 
has become the focus of modern society, it IS worshipped and considered worthy of 
awe as expressed through and by ritual attention. As Hannerz (1980, p. 210) explains, 
"People worship each other as little gods, in countless almost imperceptible ways; 
they become noticeable only In their absence, when the proper rituals are not per-
formed and when the treatment given instead is seen as symbolic violence. The 
expression of acceptance of presented selves, at least within limits, thus becomes 
part of htu rgy:' 
The rituals in which members engage attest also to the 
sanctity of the individual, for each strip of action, though car-
ried out on an individual basis, nevertheless conveys the col-
lective nature of group life. As Goffman (1967, p. 42) has stated, 
"The ritual order seems to be organized basically on accommo-
dative lines"; and further, by acquiring this ability to accommo-
date others "the person becomes a kind of construct, built up 
not from inner psychic propensities but from moral rules that 
are impressed upon him from without" (Goffman 1967, p. 45). 
This accommodative function of the ritual order is espe-
cially salient with respect to Goffman's (1971) discussion of 
"maintenance rites," These are planned, repetitive gatherings 
that celebrate or reinforce contact between persons, thereby in 
turn serving symbolically to "guarantee the well-being of the 
relationship" (Goffman 1971, p. 73). Cheal (1988, pp. 98, 102, 
106) has suggested that "rites of progression" (e.g., wedding 
anniversaries, birthdays, Mother's Day rituals) are concrete ex-
amples of the concepts we are here attempting to link: 
Goffman's maintenance rites and Durkheim's (1984, p. 122) 
"dignity of the human person" or, equivalently, "cult of the 
individual:' 
AN APPLICATION: EVANGELICALISM 
AND THE ETHIC OF CIVILITY 
Goffman's ideas concerning the accommodative function 
of the ritual order correspond as well with the concept of civil 
religion (e.g., Bellah 1964, 1967, 1970; Cuddihy 1978; Parsons 
1978; Parsons and Platt 1973) and may be fruitfully applied to 
the case of Evangelicalism and "political civility" (Hunter 1983, 
1984, 1987).10 Cladis (1992, p. 76) sets the stage by explaining 
that 
In an age marked by increased individualism and the eclipse 
of many traditional communities and social practices, 
Durkheim fears that the benefits of liberalism could be out-
10Both Parsons's "institutionalized individualism" and Bellah's "civil religion" 
are derived from Durkheim's cult of the individual, and for this reason share certain 
affinities with Goffman's ritual and interaction orders, namely the rejection of the 
utilitarian tradition that ViewS the social actor from an individualistic and hyper-
rationalistic perspective (Tseelon 1992). 
weighed by its deleterious byproducts. He reminds us that 
when we inhabit the modern world (or worlds) we still re-
ceive many shared truths and goals. We live in a public 
world, a world not simply of our own, private making. 
Durkheim attempts to expose and strengthen those ties that 
join us to each other and to a common past and shared 
future. The rights and dignity of the individual are perhaps 
the most salient feature of our solidarity in modern demo-
cratic nations. Yet these are accompanied by various social 
commitments and obligations, and they need to be situated 
in a shared, moral context (call it democratic republicanism), 
lest they promote egoism instead of what Durkheim calls 
moral individualism, a common set of liberal dispositions 
and virtues. 
As Hunter (1984, p. 364) has pointed out, virtually all of the 
world's religions manifest to some degree a radical wing of 
belief that, because it is so strongly committed to the doctrines 
and teachings of that particular religion, is apt to push its ad-
herents toward engaging in aggressive political action.11 This 
phenomenon is certainly visible in the United States with re-
gard to the political activities of certain factions within conserv-
ative Protestantism or Evangelicalism (such as the New Chris-
tian Right and the Moral Majority). Much of the political activity 
of the evangelicals, especially with regard to their attempts to 
mobilize support and affect legislation against such issues as 
the ERA, homosexuality, school prayer, and abortion (Hunter 
1987), has led to the accusation from some corners that this 
group's "extremist policies and often violent political measures 
[may indeed] undermine national democratic processes and 
even international stability" (Hunter 1984, p. 364). 
One of the great trends of modernism to which much of 
Durkheim's attention was drawn, especially as seen in the 
quote from Cladis above, has been the separation of church 
and state and the more general private/public split (Durkheim 
1974; Hall 1987). This emphasiS on the ethic of the separation 
between church and state, between religion and politics, has 
served to continually focus debate on the "proper" place of 
religion in a modern, "civil" society (Hunter 1987, p. 151). 
11( am indebted to an anonymous revIewer for bringing to my attention the 
work of James Hunter. 
Within the milieu of the civil society there exists as well a 
strong ethic of toleration, in this case, the overt support of the 
right of any group of worshipers to hold to their political, reli-
gious, or ideological beliefs, however "offensive" or distasteful 
these may appear to the society at large. It is suggested, for 
example, that sharp disagreement and open public debate on 
such issues is a sign of a healthy and tolerant democratic envi-
ronment (i.e., the instantiation of Cladis's "democratic republi-
canism"). 
The important thing to note here is that this ethic of toler-
ance entails not only a general tolerance of others, but even 
more crucially in the case of Goffman's sociology, that individu-
als be tolerable to others (Hunter 1987, p. 152). Hence, as 
Hunter (1987, p. 153) has reported, the "pugnacious" and "in-
civil" tactics of such groups as the Moral Majority, Operation 
Rescue, and other evangelicals have become tempered some-
what in recent years by the simple realization that these 
breachings of the norm of political civility have done little to 
help their cause or endear themselves to the general public.12 
Consider how Goffmanesque this "ethic of civility" (Cud-
dihy 1978) appears in Hunter's (1987, p. 152) description of the 
dilemmas faced by evangelicals in attempting to make public, 
through perhaps even "incivil" means, their particular set of 
religious and political beliefs: 
This ethic [of civility] is an ethic of gentility and studied 
moderation. It speaks of a code of social discourse whereby 
religious beliefs and political convictions are to be ex-
pressed discreetely and tactfully and in most cases, privately. 
Convictions are to be tempered by "good taste" and sensi-
bility. It is an ethic which pleads "no offense!' The greatest 
breach of these norms is belligerence and divisiveness; the 
greatest atrocity is to be offensive and thus intolerable. 
As we have already witnessed, Goffman, for much of his career, 
was concerned with cataloguing the many ways in which per-
sons manage impressions of themselves before a group of oth-
12ThiS phenomenon of accommodation IS also evident In the recent rise of 
scientific creationism, a movement that attempts to debate the theory of evolution 
and the creation not only from a theological perspective, but also from Within the 
mere secular and humanist discourses of science (Eckberg 1992). 
ers.13 These routines of everyday life, these ceremonial and 
substantive rituals played out on the public and private stage 
whereby persons exhibit through deference and demeanor the 
obligations and expectations of their group or society, were for 
Goffman the defining moment in the understanding of social 
order in general (Stein 1991, p. 422). The rituals of face-to-face 
conduct, especially as these involve the attempt to accommo-
date persons so as to avoid overt hostility and confrontation, 
are the direct descendant of the type of moral and ethical 
codes carried in Durkheim's cult of the individual or, alter-
nately, respect for the human person. 
For Goffman (1967, p. 45), the rituals of daily life them-
selves provide the basis upon which a moral career is estab-
lished. He states that 
The general capacity to be bound by moral rules may well 
belong to the individual, but the particular set of rules 
which transforms him into a human being derives from re-
quirements established in the ritual organization of social 
encounters. 
For this to work Goffman must bank heavily on Durkheim's 
suggestion that through ritual individuals produce and repro-
duce moral sentiments. The affective or expressive compo-
nents elicited as a result of the social gathering are tied symbol-
ically to, or equated with, the ritual work itself, thereby 
creating a form of sociation or consciousness that helps to per-
petuate the moral code within each individual as a lived convic-
tion. In this light Collins (1988, p. 46) argues that for Goffman 
"Everyday life is a ritual: this is a direct extension of the Durk-
heimian argument. And the primary sacred object, elevated to 
symbolic status by the way rituals are structured in everyday 
I ife, is the self:' 
In analyzing Goffman's sociology through Durkheim's cult 
of the individual, then, I have attempted to deny the extent to 
13As Burns (1992, p. 27) explains, Goffman's conception of the "interaction 
order" amounts "to the recognition by people of an obligation to display what used 
to be called 'civility' or 'good manners'-socially acceptable or 'proper' behaviour-in 
the presence of others .... The highest common factor, so to speak, is no more than 
the practice of behaving predictably, or refraining from causing offence to other 
people, or not obstructing or interfermg with their presence, passage or utterance, 
either actual or intended!' 
which many writers have placed Goffman in the utilitarian or 
individualistic camp <e.g., Alexander [1987] and Habermas 
[1984], but d. Rawls [1987]). By illustrating his deep connec-
tions to Durkheim, I have shown how Goffman's interaction 
order, built up as it is from the vast array of interpersonal rit-
uals contained therein, serves as a continuation of Durkheim's 
ideas concerning the sanctity of the individual and the progres-
sion of modern society. Both Durkheim and Goffman were 
concerned with describing how modern individualism is 
based, not so much on the strategic action of utilitarian social 
philosophy, but, rather, on the sort of morality arising, nearly in 
"sui generis" fashion (Rawls 1987), from the exigencies of face-
to-face interaction and group life. In fact, Schoenfeld and Me5-
trovic's (1991, p. 84) defense of Durkheim, in this regard, can be 
equally applied to Goffman: "In sum, Durkheim sought to de-
pict a form of individualism that is far removed from utilitarian, 
egoistic, self-interested depictions of the human person found 
in most discourse on this topic:' 
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